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The “ideology puzzle” has received considerable attention by scholars of American public 
opinion, including Ellis and Stimson (2012) in their superb examination of the subject.  The 
puzzle is that Americans who call themselves conservative outnumber those who call themselves 
liberals and yet a majority of Americans take a liberal position on most policy issues in national 
surveys.  Appropriately, Ellis and Stimson focus on the largest group of seemingly inconsistent 
Americans—those who adopt the conservative label and exhibit liberal policy views.  These 
“conflicted conservatives” take the conservative label, Ellis and Stimson argue, because of its 
importance outside of politics. Traditional values, some rooted in religious commitments, lead a 
sizable group of Americans to adopt the conservative label even when their views about public 
policy appear to be liberal. 
We make three contributions.  First, we gain a better understanding of why conflicted 
conservatives outnumber conflicted liberals by identifying the issues that create the most 
frequent mismatches for both groups (conservative labels for liberal positions and vice versa).  
We do so with new data on how Americans label their positions on individual issues.  Second, 
we extend the analysis to conflicted liberals and discover that the forces that are associated with 
mismatching in this direction are not the same as those that lead liberal positions to be labeled as 
conservative.  Third, we investigate a wider range of determinants of mismatches between labels 
and positions. Like Ellis and Stimson, we test the effects of religiosity, political sophistication, 
and elite frames on respondents’ likelihood of exhibiting ideological conflict at the issue level.  
We go beyond Ellis and Stimson to consider the effects of political identities (Conover 1984, 
Miller et al. 1981, Popp and Rudolph 2011)—ideological, partisan, and ethnic—as well as 
exposure to different media outlets and generational socialization.   
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The Symbolic-Operational Ideology Problem 
Previous research concludes that Americans’ expectations of government are remarkably 
consistent.  A majority of Americans take a liberal view of a wide range of federal programs and 
have done so in every year since 1968 (Stimson 1999). Overall, the public’s policy mood may 
shift in the conservative direction in a given year, but the balance of opinion favors the liberal 
side on a wide variety of policy questions.  Ellis and Stimson label the scaled issue-specific 
positions “operational ideology.” 
In contrast, when asked to identify their general or “symbolic ideology,” those choosing 
the “conservative” label outnumber those calling themselves “liberal.” Much like the 
longitudinal analysis of operational ideology, studies find this one-sidedness of response to be a 
consistent feature of American political attitudes (Box-Steffensmeier, Knight, and Sigelman 
1998, Robinson and Fleishman 1984, Robinson and Fleishman 1988, Smith 1990, Erikson, 
MacKuen and Stimson 2002, Stimson 2004). Using a continuous time series made possible with 
reputable polls before 1970, Ellis and Stimson (2007) find that liberal self-identification has 
declined since the New Deal. 
On balance, then, Americans espouse operationally liberal views, supporting a robust 
federal government, but at the same time more Americans consider themselves conservative than 
consider themselves liberal (Free and Cantril 1967, Miller 1992, Cantril and Cantril 1999, Jacoby 
2000, Schiffer 2000, Stimson 2004, Ellis and Stimson 2012).  The common observation about 
this asymmetry is that more than a poorly informed public is at work.  Something systematic 
creates a conservative identity for at least some Americans who take liberal positions on a 
variety of policy issues. 
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The most significant contribution of Ellis and Stimson is their consideration of three 
pathways—ideological constraint, issue framing, and apolitical sources of labeling—by which 
Americans may acquire a mismatch of operational and symbolic ideology. First, as the long-
standing theory provides (Converse 1964), ideology serves as a guide or heuristic for evaluating 
policy options and political elites (Jacoby 1991).  We now know that this ideological behavior is 
conditioned upon education and previous political engagement (Stimson 1975, Knight 1985, 
Judd and Krosnick 1989, Jacoby 1991). 
Second, the framing of political discourse by elites and the media influences how 
Americans characterize their ideological self-identification and policy preferences.  When certain 
labels are emphasized or favored by political and media elites, the public is more likely to 
identify with them than others (Conover and Feldman 1981, Gilens 2000, Iyengar 1991, Reese, 
Gandy, and Grant 2001, Sears and Funk 1990).  Elite framing often promotes the term 
“conservative,” while the term “liberal” is used with much less frequency and has long had a 
more negative connotation. Ellis and Stimson (2007) believe that this asymmetric framing is 
grounded in the events of the last half-century that associated liberal views with minorities and 
social change, which led the public to hold, conservative identification in higher esteem 
(Jennings 1992, Schiffer 2000). In response, liberal elites often eschew the label in favor of 
“progressive” or an emphasis on the specific details of how they would address social problems 
(Sears and Citrin 1985), while conservative elites retain the label and attack government in 
general (Jacoby 2000). 
Third, and most notable, Ellis and Stimson observe that there are apolitical bases for 
adopting the conservative label.  Some Americans, they argue, associate the conservative label 
with traditional values, including religious values, patriotism, and temperance, which leads them 
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to choose conservative as the label best fitting their own identity in response to standard survey 
questions about ideological identity (Kellstedt and Smidt 1991).  For such Americans, the 
conservative label is preferred to the liberal label, although many of them choose liberal 
positions on contemporary political or policy issues.   
In the Ellis and Stimson account, it is the category of “conflicted conservatives” who are 
responsible for most of the mismatch between aggregate statistics on symbolic and operation 
ideology.  Conflicted conservatives are distinctive for being less well educated, less 
knowledgeable and engaged, less affluent, more white and suburban, and more likely to live in 
traditional family structures than unconflicted conservatives and liberals (Ellis and Stimson 
2012, 152).  They “believe that government policies should be guided by principles of caution, 
restraint, and respect for traditional values, moral and economic” (Ellis and Stimson 2012, 177) 
and adopt “conservative” as a label for what may be an “extra-political” identity, but 
nevertheless, on balance, hold liberal views on a range of public policy issues.  That is—
remarkably—at least some people respond to the standard self-placement survey question, “when 
it comes to politics, do you usually think of yourself as…,” in a non-political way. 
Other studies do not contradict the general empirical argument of Ellis and Stimson about 
the mismatch of symbolic and operational ideology, but the theoretical narratives diverge from 
the Ellis-Stimson account in important ways.  One account emphasizes the bidimensionality of 
American political preferences; the other emphasizes that different evaluative processes may 
operate for the choice symbolic label than for the responses to issue questions.   
The first critique is implicit in the observation that Americans’ policy preferences are not 
unidimensional, even in an era of partisan polarization, and are probably best characterized by at 
least two dimensions, an economic or social welfare dimension and a social, moral, or cultural 
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dimension (Feldman and Johntson 2013, Layman and Carsey 2002, Shafer and Claggett 1995, 
Treier and Hillygus 2009, Zumbrunnen and Gangl 2008).  These two dimensions are only 
modestly correlated: at 0.30 in Treier and Hillygus (2009) and 0.21 and 0.36 in Feldman and 
Johnston’s (2013) two samples. Shafer and Claggett (1995) infer that the two dimensions of 
American political attitudes create “two majorities” with different social and political 
compositions.  Since the correlation between the two dimensions is modest, the dimensions 
exhibit quite different distributions of individuals and the analytic application of “liberal” and 
“conservative” labels to both dimensions becomes problematic.   
Indeed, if the symbolic labels that people choose reflect some aggregate of the location 
across the two incommensurable dimensions, many Americans must struggle to apply the labels.  
In fact, as Fiorina et al. (2005) emphasize, a plurality of Americans identify themselves as 
“moderate” or reply “don’t know” when asked, “When it comes to politics, do you usually think 
of yourself as extremely liberal, liberal, slightly liberal, moderate or middle of the road, slightly 
conservative, conservative, extremely conservative, or haven’t you thought much about this?”   
Moreover, we have known for some time that individuals with a mix of attitudes tend to choose 
“moderate” as their label more than individuals with more “consistent” attitudes (Alvarez and 
Brehm 1995, Treier and Hillygus 2009). 
More recent research has shown that not only are there are at least two dimensions of 
policy preferences, individuals vary in the salience they ascribe to each, and thus in the manner 
in which they fashion belief systems out of the two dimensions (Feldman and Johnston 2013, 
Baldassari and Goldberg n.d.). Some individuals adopt the unidimensional liberal-conservative 
continuum espoused by elites, and are thus liberal (or conservative) on both dimensions. Other 
individuals only show coherent belief systems on one of the two dimensions of ideology, with 
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reliably liberal (or conservative) views on these issues, and disorganized views on the other 
dimension. Baldassari and Goldberg (n.d.) suggest that there is a further group of individuals 
who do not exhibit an organized belief system on either of the dimensions. This research presents 
perhaps the sharpest challenge to Ellis and Stimson’s account, suggesting that the operational-
symbolic paradox may be no more than a manifestation of the varying saliences that individuals 
ascribe to each ideological dimension. 
Unfortunately, the Ellis-Stimson analysis of dimensionality is somewhat ambiguous.  
One treatment of the subject (Ellis and Stimson 2012, Chapter 3) is based on the Stimson mood 
measures and finds, with a nonorthogonal rotation of factors, that two dimensions emerge but are 
correlated at 0.80.  This leads to the inference that the two dimensions exist but few Americans 
have conflicting views across the two dimensions.  A second treatment of the subject (Ellis and 
Stimson 2012, Chapter 5), based on the spending questions in the General Social Survey, also 
finds two dimensions, but the two dimensions are correlated at only 0.20 and both have a 
significant and nearly equal correlation with symbolic ideology (Ellis and Stimson 2012, 109 and 
119).  The second treatment suggests the existence of many conflicted Americans and is 
consistent with most other studies.  In that analysis, Ellis and Stimson find that over a quarter of 
self-identified liberals do not hold liberal policy positions on both dimensions (Ellis and Stimson 
2012, 109-110).  This number is much smaller than the 80 percent of self-identified 
conservatives who hold a liberal balance of policy positions on one of the two dimensions, but 
the conflicted liberals appear to be a group that warrants analysis, as the Treier and Hillygus 
findings suggest. 
A second critique can be read in Popp and Rudolph’s (2011) distinction between ideology 
as an identity and ideology as a principled belief.  These authors argue that the classical view of 
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ideology as an overarching and constraining belief system (Converse 1960, Feldman 1988) is too 
simple. Instead, ideology entails two separate evaluative processes. The first is indeed the 
classical belief system: a set of core principles about the proper role of government that is closely 
related to operational ideology. The second, however, sees ideology as a set of identities 
(Conover and Feldman 1981, Zschirnt 2011): an affective attachment to ideological groups and 
their attendant symbols. This second evaluative process is thought to underpin symbolic 
ideology. 
Popp and Rudolph’s two-process theory severs the logical link between operational and 
symbolic ideology. In doing so, they turn the operational-symbolic paradox on its head: while 
authors like Ellis and Stimson focus on the substantial proportions of individuals who have 
conservative symbolic and liberal operational ideologies, the two-process theory suggests that we 
cannot necessarily expect to see congruence between symbolic and operational ideologies. 
Indeed, while Ellis and Stimson regard the relationship between liberal symbolic and liberal 
operational ideology to be straightforward, Popp and Rudolph, using different measures, find 
slightly more conflicted liberals than conflicted conservatives  (13 versus 10 percent).  
 
The Present Study 
We replicate Ellis and Stimson’s analysis, taking heed of the critiques implied in the 
bidimensionality and two-processes theses, and then seek to extend our understanding of the 
operational-symbolic paradox. Our primary innovation is to focus on the level of issues, rather 
than the level of general operational and symbolic ideologies. This contrast in levels of 
granularity, coupled with the distinction between operational beliefs and symbolic attachments, 
yield the possibilities described in Table 1: operational preferences may exist both at the issue 
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level (which we call “issue positions”) and at the level of general ideology (“operational 
ideology”); labels may be similarly applied to one’s general ideology (“symbolic ideology”) and 
one’s particular issues positions (“issue labels”). Ellis and Stimson compare general orientations: 
symbolic (self identity) and operational ideology (aggregated issue scales). While we have these 
measures we also gather and analyze issue level data on positions and symbolic labels.  
[Table 1] 
While creating operational ideology scales by aggregating over issues can be justified on 
the grounds of improved measurement of the underlying attitudes, there is a cost.  Because issue 
positions are likely to vary in their distributional properties and salience, the aggregation over 
multiple issues may camouflage the nature of the issues that cause a mismatch between symbolic 
labels and issue positions.  Viewed using scaled, general-level data, the operational symbolic 
paradox may be no more than the differing salience that citizens attach to different issues, or 
different issue dimensions.  Issue-level data will allow us to determine whether some issues 
contribute disproportionately to the mismatch of symbolic and operational ideology.  
Moreover, we do not know whether Americans label their issue positions on specific 
policy questions as analysts do.  Analytically-defined “conflicted” respondents may not be 
conflicted in their own eyes and the “unconflicted” respondents may exhibit more mismatches of 
positions and labels than we appreciate.  To determine whether “mismatching” extends to issue 
labels, we must inspect the way that survey respondents assign labels to their issue positions. 
In addition to evaluating issue-level data, we extend the Ellis-Stimson analysis by 
considering ideological incongruence in both directions—conflicted liberals as well as conflicted 
conservatives. While Ellis and Stimson set aside the former because there are few in their 
sample, Popp and Rudolph find similar numbers of conflicted liberals and conflicted 
10 
conservatives. In any case, we question the justification for setting aside conflicted liberals.  If 
Ellis and Stimson are correct, conflicted conservatives are a distinctive group—whose 
incongruence is characterized by low knowledge and high religiosity—but this claim would be 
stronger if we could demonstrate that conflicted conservatives and conflicted liberals are 
different in significant ways.  If, on the other hand, they are similar—say, both groups are 
comprised of unsophisticated, apolitical people who misuse ideological labels for themselves and 
issues—then much of the Ellis-Stimson argument must be reconsidered. 
We report our findings in two parts.  Our issue-level data on policy positions and the 
corresponding symbolic labels that respondents attach to these is unique, so we expend much 
effort in bivariate analyses. We examine the degree of ideological congruence at both the general 
and issue levels. We also take a closer look at the correspondence between general symbolic 
labels and those used for particular issues. Finally, we examine position-label incongruences by 
issue, which also permits a test of the multidimensionality thesis outlined above.  
Second, we conduct multivariate analyses of the determinants of operational-symbolic 
ideological incongruence, using both general and issue-level measures. Like Ellis and Stimson, 
we conduct these analyses for conflicted conservatives, but we also extend the analysis to 
conflicted liberals. This analysis permits us to re-test and extend the Ellis and Stimson thesis and 
test additional hypotheses derived from other studies. These hypotheses are outlined in the next 
section.   
 
Determinants of Symbolic-Operational Inconsistency at the Issue Level 
Ellis and Stimson (2007, 2012) identify three pathways for the acquisition of symbolic ideology: 
ideological constraint, the framing effects of elite political discourse, and the influence of 
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nonpolitical identities and values.  We accept those hypotheses as possible determinants of issue-
level symbolic-operational inconsistency, but expand on the Ellis-Stimson analysis in three 
ways. First, following Popp and Rudolph (2011), we give more explicit and extensive attention 
to group identity as a source of mismatch between positions and labels.  Second, following the 
bidimensionality thesis, we test for the relative effects of economic and cultural beliefs on issue-
label mismatching. Finally, we provide additional measures of Ellis and Stimson’s second 
pathway: the framing effects of elite political discourse.   
Identities. Social identity is the categorization of the self as a member of a social group. 
So categorized, individuals become attached to their identities, perhaps even deriving esteem 
from them (Tajfel 1981). Identities thus have the power to shape individual beliefs and 
evaluations. In particular, identification with a group produces conformity to the group’s 
prototype goals and beliefs (Turner 1991). A wide variety of group identities have been linked 
with variation in political beliefs or attitudes (e.g., Conover 1984). We focus on three in 
particular: ideological, partisan, and ethnic identities.  We hypothesize that identification with 
any these groups might shape the degree to which individuals match ideological labels to issue 
positions. 
Ideological Identities. Popp and Rudolph’s (2011) distinction between ideology as a set 
of identities and ideology as a coherent belief system suggests that ideology may play two 
contrasting roles in position-label mismatches. In particular, operational ideology is expected to 
play the familiar constraining role, reducing incongruence between positions and labels. Identity 
plays a distorting role in the operational-symbolic paradox because individuals’ attachments to 
their ideological groups may override the constraining role played by their belief system. Of 
course, in Ellis and Stimson’s analysis of incongruence at the general level of operational and 
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symbolic ideologies, symbolic identification is the outcome, and thus cannot be used as an 
explanation. At the issue level, which we examine, we expect that ideological identities will 
generate incongruence between positions and labels for some people.  
Partisan Identities. Partisan identity has occupied a prominent role in political behavior 
since The American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960). These identities influence policy attitudes 
through a number of processes, including priming, cue-taking, framing, projection, and 
dissonance reduction (Alvarez and Brehm 2002; Feldman 1988; Goren 2005; Green, Palmquist, 
and Schickler 2002; Sniderman and Stigliz 2012). We expect that party identities will influence 
ideological congruence due to the differing sentiments toward the conservative and liberal labels 
in contemporary American politics: the former being viewed more favorably than the latter 
(Schiffer 2000). We also know that Democratic elites emphasize their policy positions and avoid 
using the liberal label, while Republican elites freely emphasize conservative labels (Ellis and 
Stimson 2012).  We thus hypothesize that Democrat party identifiers will similarly focus on 
issue positions rather than labels and avoid the liberal label. Republicans, in contrast, will 
embrace the conservative label, perhaps using it at times considered inappropriate by the analyst.  
Ethnic Identities. The New Deal, Great Society, and the civil rights movement altered 
the relationship between major ethnic groups on ideological and partisan labels.  Given the links 
among liberal policies, the group interests of black Americans, and cues from black elites, we 
hypothesize that individuals identifying as African American are likely to favor the liberal label, 
perhaps to the extent of using this label to describing conservative issue positions.  For similar 
reasons, we hypothesize that identifying as Hispanic produces a favorable view of liberalism and 
a commensurate increase in the likelihood of making conservative position-liberal label 
mismatches (Clawson and Trice 2000).  
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Framing Effects of Elite Political Discourse 
Sophistication.  A vast body of research examines how knowledge of politics and 
government affects citizens' evaluation of policy (Wittkopf 1990; Feldman and Steenbergen 
2001).  At an early stage, the authors of The American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960, Converse 
1964) demonstrated that the most sophisticated individuals are most likely to identify their 
political views correctly as liberal or conservative, and that those lacking in political 
sophistication tend not to identify themselves as liberals or conservatives.  Others find evidence 
to support the view that the more politically sophisticated a respondent is, the more likely she is 
to have a strong connection between issue preferences and ideological labels (Delli Carpini and 
Keeter 1996, Zaller 1992, Goren 2004) and show less consistency of preferences (Feldman 1988, 
Goren 2004).  This line of research suggests that less sophisticated citizens have a weaker grasp 
of the standard usage of political terminology, such as symbolic labels, than more sophisticated 
citizens.  “Mismatches” of issue positions and labels are expected to be inversely correlated with 
sophistication. 
Exposure to Specific Media Outlets. Ellis and Stimson propose that elite discourse 
helps shape conservative identification and the subsequent operational-symbolic divide. Media 
elites are particularly likely to use the liberal and conservative labels, especially in a normative 
fashion. In particular, the authors provide empirical evidence indicating that major media outlets 
such as USA Today and The New York Times are not only more likely to use the word 
“conservative” than “liberal” in a political context, they are also more likely to use the word 
“conservative” in a non-political context. Furthermore, such news outlets are more likely to 
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attach positive connotations to “conservative” than they are to “liberal,” and to attach negative 
connotations to the word “liberal.”  
Ellis and Stimson (2012, 169-173) test for the effects of news exposure with a measure 
on which survey respondents were asked to indicate the number of days on which they read a 
newspaper or watched network television news.  Overall, there is no measurable effect of news 
exposure on being a conflicted conservative, although the middle third of respondents on a 
political knowledge scale exhibit a small effect.  This middle tier is deemed most likely to be 
both open to the reception and acceptance of elite framing. 
As a test of the media effects, the Ellis-Stimson analysis is limited.  While it captures 
overall news exposure, it does not distinguish news sources and so does not test the selective 
exposure thesis that has taken on greater significance as the variety of news sources has 
multiplied (Best, et al. 2005, Mutz and Martin 2001, Mutz 2006, Stroud 2008, Taber and Lodge 
2006).  That is, individuals, perhaps by choice, are exposed to homogeneous, politically biased, 
and partisan frames that affect their interpretation of the political world, their views on issues, 
the labels they use, and their ideological identities.  Strong ideological identities may guide the 
choice of media to consume so the effects of identity and exposure may be duplicative or 
additive. 
We take a step beyond the Ellis-Stimson analysis to consider the relationship between 
exposure to various television networks and mismatches in labels and policy positions.  The 
working hypothesis is that, all things being equal, exposure to biased media news coverage is 
associated with a greater commitment to a conservative (or liberal) label, whatever one’s views 
on individual policy issues, and create more frequent mismatches. 
15 
Generational Socialization. Ellis and Stimson note that the term liberal assumed its 
distinctive meaning in the US context in the 1930s. It also became tainted in the late 1960s. Their 
argument suggests that generational effects may play a role in the extent to which the liberal 
label is over- or under-used. Individuals reaching adulthood in the late 1960s or later would 
likely have developed a distinctive set of connotations attached to the word “liberal.” We 
hypothesize that these generations of Americans avoid the liberal label compared to earlier 
generations. They will, moreover, be attracted to the conservative label. We should see an 
increase in liberal policy-conservative label mismatches in generations reaching maturity after 
1965, as well as a decrease in the reverse pattern of mismatches.  
Religious Values and Identity. The final of Ellis and Stimson’s arguments is that 
religiosity, or intensity of religious practice, is linked with ideological inconsistency. Many 
Americans encounter religious symbols on a weekly or even daily basis, but limit their attention 
of politics to electoral cycles (Beatty and Walter 1989).  As a result, they may be more familiar 
with the term “conservative” as it relates to religion and morality. Religious conservatism is an 
important part of a churchgoer's identity (Leege and Kellstedt 1993).  There is a prominent 
exception to this line of argument. Putnam and Campbell (2010) find that differences in opinion 
on most issues between the least and most religious citizens are actually quite small; only the 
social or cultural issues of abortion and same-sex marriage produce large divergences.  We infer 
that religious practices should affect the frequency and direction of ideological mismatches, 
although Putnam and Campbell suggest that there is an interaction effect with issue dimension. 
Those who attend religious services, regardless of denomination, should encounter conservative 
symbols more often. For this reason, they too will be more likely to apply a conservative label to 
describe a political position. 
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Ellis and Stimson recognize that religious affiliation may be a source of identity, but they 
do not examine the relationship between being a conflicted conservative and denominational 
affiliation.  Instead, they consider biblical literalism to be a core belief of religious conservatives 
and find that it is related to symbolic ideology (Ellis and Stimson 2012, 128-131, 138-140).  We 
consider both religious conservatism and religious affiliation by comparing evangelical 
Christians to other citizens. 
 
The Bidimensionality of Operational Ideology 
The bidimensionality thesis implies that mismatches between issues and labels may be a 
function of the two dimensions of operational ideology. An individual may, for example, hold 
conservative preferences on the dominant economic dimension of ideology, with a 
commensurate conservative symbolic identity, but liberal preferences on cultural issues. If a 
single dimension of operational ideology is aggregated from this individual’s disparate 
preferences, it may appear that she is operationally liberal but symbolically conservative. We test 
the separate effects of economic and cultural beliefs on position-label mismatches.  
  
Methods and Data 
Data for our analysis are drawn from The American Panel Survey (TAPS).  TAPS is a monthly 
online panel survey of over 2,000 people.  Panelists were recruited as a national probability 
sample with an addressed-based sampling frame in the fall of 2011 by Knowledge Networks 
(now GfK Knowledge Networks) for the Weidenbaum Center at Washington University.  
Individuals without internet access were provided a laptop and internet service at the expense of 
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the Weidenbaum Center.  In a typical month, over 1,700 of the panelists complete the online 
survey.  More technical information about the survey is available at taps.wustl.edu. 
Data on policy preferences were available for 1,725 respondents from surveys conducted 
in December 2011 and February 2012. Item non-response within this sub-sample was tackled 
using the method of multiple imputation, where ten unique datasets were created using an 
algorithm to stochastically impute missing values for each dataset (see Rubin 1987).  All 
estimates are weighted by the inverse of the probability of selection into the sample. 
Respondents were asked for their positions on 22 issues that were selected to represent 
different areas of American domestic and foreign policy (see Table S1 in the supplementary 
materials for item wording).  To focus our attention on the policies that are most central to 
politics, we selected 14 of these items, using two criteria.  First, to be comparable to Ellis and 
Stimson, foreign policy items were dropped (these focused on defense spending, international 
trade, the war in Afghanistan, and democracy promotion abroad). We then excluded four 
additional questions tapping preferences for low-salience policies that were only weakly 
correlated with than other items (support for farm subsidies, nuclear power, campaign finance 
reform, and domestic wiretapping). Fourteen items remain; these form the set of issue position 
and labels utilized in this analysis. 
Issue positions are measured on a five-point scale (strongly agree, agree, neither agree 
nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree). After answering each of these questions, respondents 
were asked to label their position on the issue as “conservative,” “moderate,” “liberal,” or “none 
of these.” Central to the following analysis is the notion of a mismatch between the issue 
position and the corresponding label.  A mismatch occurs when either of the two liberal positions 
on the five-point scale (directionality determined in scaling) is matched with a conservative label 
18 
or either of the two conservative positions is matched with a liberal label.  Moderate issue 
positions and labels, and the label “none of these,” are not counted as mismatches. 
 
Findings 
The Symbolic-Operational Paradox at the General and Issue Level 
 The cross-tabulation of symbolic and operational ideology is shown in Table 2.  The most 
obvious feature of the table is that the column percentages (lower left in each cell) confirm four 
central facts of the Ellis-Stimson argument. First, operational liberals outnumber operational 
conservatives. Second, symbolic conservatives slightly outnumber symbolic liberals. Third, 
symbolic liberals are almost entirely operationally liberal and symbolic moderates lean liberal, 
too. Finally, conflicted conservatives (symbolic conservatives who scale on the liberal side on 
issue positions) outnumber conflicted liberals.   
[Table 2] 
It is equally important to recognize the row percentages.  A sizable majority of 
operational conservatives call themselves conservatives and most of the rest call themselves 
moderates.  In contrast, operational liberals are split about equally between self-identified 
liberals and moderates, with a few conservatives.  It is tempting to see this as confirming 
evidence that the liberal label is socially undesirable even for “true” liberals, but we do not have 
direct evidence of perceived desirability. 
The frequency of mismatches between issue positions and issue labels is then reported in 
Table 3.  For this table, the unit of analysis is a respondent’s issue position and label so that an 
individual is included 14 times, once for each of the 14 issues.  The standard ideological labels—
conservative, moderate, liberal—were chosen as labels for issue positions nearly four-fifths of 
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the time.  “None of these,” a conspicuous option presented with the standard labels, was a 
response about one-fifth of the time.  For moderate issue positions (the middle response), “none 
of these” was the plurality choice of label (42 percent), in contrast to about 16 percent for liberal 
and conservative positions.   
[Table 3] 
Looking at the row percentages in Table 3, only 32 percent of the issue positions that we 
would label “liberal” are labeled liberal by respondents and 40 percent are labeled “moderate.”  
In contrast, half the conservative positions are labeled conservative, with a further quarter 
labeled moderate.  The percentage of conservative positions labeled liberal (eight percent) is 
lower than the percentage of liberal positions labeled conservative (12 percent), but the 
difference is modest.  There is little difference in the frequency of “none of these.”  We thus 
infrequently observe liberal positions coupled with conservative labels and conservative 
positions coupled with liberal labels.  Nearly all of the difference in choice of labels between 
conservative and liberal positions is in the use of the moderate label.   
Looking at the column percentages in Table 3, conservative labels get applied to liberal 
positions over 22 percent of the time, while liberal labels are applied to conservative positions 
only 14 percent of the time.  As for the symbolic-issue position mismatch, conservative labels 
are more likely to be used “correctly” than liberal labels, although the imbalance between 
conflicted conservative and conflicted liberal uses is not nearly as great.   
Only eight percent of position-label pairs consist of significant mismatches of the liberal 
or conservative label to the opposing position. Instead, most mismatches between issue positions 
and issue labels involve the moderate label—and, indeed, liberal positions labeled as moderate 
are the most common kind of mismatch between issue positions and labels.  It is entirely possible 
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that this is not an “error” or “mismatch” at all, but rather it is a product of the questions and 
response sets that lead some respondents to favor a liberal (or conservative) issue position (say, 
more spending on education), arbitrarily set to be on one side of the “neither agree nor disagree” 
middle option and still recognize that as a moderate position.  For the regression analysis that 
follows, we do not consider a liberal position/moderate label or conservative position/moderate 
label pair to be a mismatch.    
At the level of issue positions and issue labels, the asymmetry between conflicted 
conservatives and liberals is not as great as it is at the general level, between symbolic and 
operational ideology.  As a result, we have more cases of conflict between conservative labels 
and liberal issue positions to study.  We consider the determinants of this type of mismatch 
below along with the more numerous cases in which a liberal label is applied to a conservative 
position.  We will show that the correlates of a mismatch are not the same for the two directions. 
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Symbolic Ideology and Issue Labels 
The relationship between ideological identity (symbolic labels) and issue labels is 
complicated, primarily by our introduction of “none of these” as an option as an issue label.  For 
some issues (Table 4), as many as a third of the respondents choose “none of these” over 
conservative, moderate, and liberal as a label for their issue position.  This may reflect (a) a way 
to resolve a conflict between a symbolic identity and an issue position, (b) uncertainty about the 
appropriate label, or (c) a belief that the standard labels do not apply to the issue.  In Table 4, we 
list the 14 issues in the order of frequency of the “none of these” response for respondents who 
report a conservative, moderate, and liberal ideological identity. 
[Table 4] 
For all three symbolic labels, positions on taxing the wealthy, education, same sex 
marriage, and abortion are readily labeled with the standard labels. Taxing the wealthy and 
education spending are traditional economic issues, while same sex marriage and abortion are 
typically classified as social or cultural issues (Ellis and Stimson 2012, Treier and Hillygus 
2009).   Nevertheless, these four issues are distinctive with respect to the ease with which 
Americans use the traditional labels.  
In contrast, positions on Medicare and social security are frequently labeled “none of 
these” by conservatives, moderates, and liberals.  Plainly, these issues are salient programs and 
are subject to considerable debate between conservative and liberal elites, but many Americans, 
nearly a third, do not choose to use the traditional ideological labels to characterize their views.  
A reasonable hypothesis is that conservatives use “none of these” as a way to avoid explicit 
conflict between their ideological identity and issue position in support of these programs, but it 
turns out conservatives are not much different from liberals and moderates in this respect.  It 
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seems more likely that these programs are popular and so well accepted that many Americans do 
not perceive the standard lines of political conflict to be relevant to them.  If so, the issues may 
not scale well (and they do not) because of the lopsided marginal in support of the programs. 
Moderates are much more likely than liberals and conservatives to choose “none of these” 
as a label for their issue positions and they do so more consistently.  Many moderates may 
choose the moderate label for themselves because they do not or refuse to see the political 
landscape in liberal-conservative terms.  Other moderates may not be capable of applying the 
standard terms and so opt for “none of these.” 
[Figure 1] 
In Figure 1, the relationship between symbolic ideology and issue labels is shown.  
Aggregating the classification of policy preferences across all 14 issues provides insight into 
how label application differs across the three major symbolic ideological groups.  Symbolic 
conservatives demonstrate a strong attraction to identifying their positions as conservative 
(roughly 49 percent) and an equally strong aversion to labeling their preferences as liberal (about 
six percent). Still, our results indicate that a slight majority of all issue labeling among symbolic 
conservatives involves a non-conservative term, with the moderate label chosen often.  Symbolic 
liberals are a different story. More often than not, one who identifies as a liberal in the general 
sense will classify their policy position as moderate than liberal.  Finally, symbolic moderates do 
not appear to favor liberal classifications over conservative ones, or vice versa. Rather, 
“moderate” or “none of these” make up nearly two-thirds of all symbolic moderate labeling of 
preferences. 
 
Economic Versus Cultural Issues 
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Further disaggregating the issue-level patterns, we show the frequency of mismatches 
between issues positions and labels in Figure 2, where economic issues are distinguished from 
cultural issues.  Again, liberal issue positions labeled conservative outnumber conservative issue 
positions labeled liberal.  Moreover, while conflicted liberalism is produced in both economic 
and cultural issues, conflicted conservatism is largely produced by conflict on the economic 
dimension.  In fact, most of the liberal operational – conservative symbolic conflict displayed in 
the left column of Figure 2 occurs on the popular programs of Medicare, education, and Social 
Security. These popular programs are well established and bring conservative elites to their 
defense (often in the form of “reform to save” the program).  It may not be surprising, then, that 
individuals disposed to use conservative labels apply their favorite label to an issue position that 
they hold along with the vast majority of other Americans. 
[Figure 2] 
Conflicted conservatism at the issue level appears to be attributable to individuals who 
support continued education and welfare spending, but who couple these liberal positions with 
conservative identities. The role of economic and cultural ideology in shaping both conflicted 
conservatism and liberalism will be tested further in the regression analyses in the next section.  
 
Multivariate Analysis of the Determinants of Mismatching 
  Next, we pursue multivariate analyses of the determinants of mismatching labels and 
positions. Estimates of multivariate models will allow us, first, to test whether the determinants 
of mismatches for issue-level symbolic labels and positions are the same as they are for general-
level symbolic and operational ideology.  These models will also allow us to extend the analysis 
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of Ellis and Stimson by testing the effects of group identities, sophistication, media sources, and 
generational differences on ideological incongruence. 
Tables 5 and 6 report parallel estimates for our two levels of analysis:  the mismatch of 
symbolic and operational ideology at the general level, and the mismatch of positions and labels 
at the issue level.  Table 5 tests the determinants of general-level mismatches. We construct the 
dependent variables for these models in the same ways as  Ellis and Stimson: for each of the 14 
issues, a respondent is given a +1, 0, or -1 for liberal, neutral, and conservative issue positions, 
the values are summed, and a positive score is treated as a liberal operational ideology, with 
positions a negative score regarded as a conservative operational ideology.  These are compared 
to the chosen symbolic label to create a dichotomous dependent variable for whether the 
respondents’ operational and symbolic ideologies match or not. 
For Table 6, the dependent variable is the number of mismatches between issue positions 
and labels across the 14 issues.  A mismatch occurs when respondents use the conservative 
(liberal) label to describe a policy preference in the liberal (conservative) direction.1 A 
“moderate” label or middle issue position is not categorized as a mismatch.  Therefore, our 
estimates may well be a lower bound on the true extent of label-issues mismatches.   
                                                            
1 The mismatch variables can be described using binomial distributions, being counts of the 
number of “successes” out of the 14 “trials” we asked each respondent to conduct. Logistic-binomial 
regression models are thus used. In the same way that the binomial distribution is a more general version 
of the Bernoulli distribution that is used to model dichotomous variables, the logistic-binomial regression 
model is a generalization of the much more well-known logit. See Gelman and Hill (2007, 116-8) for 
more details.  
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In contrast to Ellis and Stimson, who set aside conflicted liberals for most of their 
analysis, we include mismatches in both directions for both levels of analysis.  Because the 
determinants may (and prove to) be different for the two directions, we estimate the effects of the 
possible determinants separately for mismatches between liberal labels and conservative 
positions, and vice versa.   
Ideological Incongruence at the General Level.   The models that most closely 
replicate the Ellis-Stimson analysis are reported in Table 5, particularly the second column, 
which displays the results of the regression of whether respondents were conflicted 
conservatives. Like Ellis and Stimson, we find that being politically unsophisticated, religious, 
and having a strong ideological identity are all associated with a greater probability of being a 
conflicted conservative. Identifying as a Democrat, and economic (but not cultural) operational 
ideology are also associated with being a conflicted conservative.   
We then use a similar regression model to investigate general-level conflicted liberals. As 
with conflicted conservatives, operational ideology on economic issues is related to conflict. But 
in contrast to the conflicted conservatives in this and Ellis and Stimson’s sample, being a 
conflicted liberal is not associated with lower levels of political knowledge or higher levels of 
religiosity. Indeed, there are few significant variables for this model, possibly due to blunt 
measure of the dependent variable: an indicator for general-level incongruence between 
operational and symbolic ideology. We thus turn to our more finely-grained, issue-level 
measures for further analyses of both conflicted liberals and conflicted conservatives.  
Ideological Incongruence at the Issue Level.  The models of issue-level mismatches are 
reported in Table 6, where the dependent variable is the number of mismatches. There are two 
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models, one for each direction of mismatch.2  Predicted effects for the significant variables are 
then plotted in Figure 3.  
Ideological identities have the hypothesized effects on issue-label incongruence: 
conservatives (and moderates) are more likely than liberals to use the conservative label for 
liberal positions, while liberals (and, again, moderates) are more likely than conservatives to 
refer to conservative positions as liberal. In addition, the predicted effects in Figure 3 show that 
while liberals are roughly as likely to make either sort of mismatch, conservatives are much more 
likely to overuse the conservative label.  
With respect to partisan identities, Democrats are significantly less likely (than 
Independents) to be conflicted liberals at the issue level; they are not, however, any more likely 
to use the conservative label for any liberal positions they may take. Republicans are 
significantly more likely to be conflicted conservative at the issue level, again, when compared 
with Independents, but they show no diminished propensity for describing conservative positions 
as liberal.  These effects can be easily seen in Figure 3.  In addition the figure shows that both 
Democrats and Republicans are more likely to mismatch conservative labels to liberal positions. 
This is a departure from the predicted effects for ideological identities, where liberals are as 
likely to make either kind of mismatch.   
                                                            
2 Note that because we expect some of the explanatory variables to have differently signed effects 
across the two directions, such as holding a liberal or conservative identity, it does not make sense to 
combine the two forms of mismatch—in other words, to have a single model predicting issue-label 
mismatches regardless of direction. If such a model is specified (see Table S2 in the supplementary 
materials), such effects get cancelled out. 
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With respect to ethnic identity, Figure 2 shows that black or Hispanic identifiers have 
elevated probabilities of making conservative position-liberal label mismatches compared to 
other ethnic groups (but not liberal position-conservative label mismatches).3  
Like Ellis and Stimson, we find that being knowledgeable about politics reduces 
ideological incongruence. This effect can be seen in the predicted effects plots in Figure 3: low 
political knowledge is associated with a .70 probability of using the conservative label for a 
liberal position, dropping to .42 for high levels of knowledge. The effect is even more 
pronounced for conflicted liberal mismatches, moving from .44 at high knowledge to .17 at low 
knowledge.  
Unlike Ellis and Stimson, who did not explore news sources, we find evidence that 
particular media outlets shape ideological inconsistency. In particular, watching Fox News has a 
significant effect on the propensity to mismatch liberal issue positions and conservative labels.  
Our model predicts that, holding all other variables constant, watching Fox News increases the 
likelihood of using the conservative label for a liberal position from .50 to .64 compared to 
people obtaining their news from other sources. The hypothesis that MSNBC has the equivalent 
effect on mislabeling conservative policy preferences as liberal is not supported. It therefore 
appears that the effect of Fox News on ideological inconsistency is unique among media outlets. 
For examining the effect of age, we also include a quadratic term to capture the nonlinear 
hypothesis suggested by Ellis and Stimson: that the 1960s were something of a watershed in 
                                                            
3 Note that because Asian Americans, as a group, have experienced less poverty than African- or 
Hispanic-Americans, we do not hypothesize that Asian ethnic identifiers will show increased conservative 
position-liberal label ideological incongruence; nor is there any evidence of such an effect. 
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public approval of the liberal identity. These effects are most easily visualized in the predicted 
effects plot of Figure 3. Although only the coefficient of the quadratic term of age in the 
conflicted conservatism model is significant at the 95 percent confidence level, the signs of both 
quadratic terms are supportive of the Ellis and Stimson thesis. The propensity to be a conflicted 
conservative at the issue level is lowest among the oldest respondents, peaks just before the age 
of 50, before falling again for younger respondents. Age then shows a mirror-image effect on 
conflicted liberalism: older and younger respondents are most likely to use the liberal label for 
conservative policies, with those in their 50s least likely to do so.  
Central to this analysis of Ellis and Stimson is the role of extra-political interpretations of 
ideological labels, largely due to the influence of religious conservatism in individuals’ 
ideological identities. To measure religiosity, an additive scale of respondents’ answers to four 
questions (see Table S1 in the supplementary materials) regarding levels of church attendance, 
belief in God, and frequency of prayer was created. Consistent with this previously defined 
pathway, our regression shows that greater religiosity is associated with a higher frequency of 
liberal position-conservative label mismatches.4   Religiosity does not appear to have an effect on 
the frequency of conservative position-liberal label mismatches. The contrasting slopes for these 
two effects are visible in Figure 3. Respondents who are not religious at all show little difference 
in their propensity to make either kind of labeling error (probabilities = .32 and .24). The very 
religious are much more likely to make liberal position-conservative label mismatches 
(probability = .63) than conservative position-liberal label mismatches (probability = .24).  
                                                            
4 We checked whether religious affiliation—Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, etc.—has an effect on 
ideological incongruence. It does not, regardless of the direction of mismatch. This analysis is available 
from the authors upon request. 
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Finally, the effects of economic and cultural beliefs confirms the initial pattern observed 
in Figure 2: both domains of ideology play a role in conflicted liberalism, but only economic 
beliefs matter for conflicted conservatism. The more liberal an individual’s economic and 
cultural operational ideologies, the less the issue-label inconsistency; the more conservative an 
individual’s economic ideology, the same. These belief systems constrain issue-label matches, 
decreasing incongruence.  The lack of an effect of cultural ideology on conflicted conservatism 
suggests that the latter is not merely a function of the two-dimensional issue space.5  
We should point out, however, that there is another way, not tested here, that two 
dimensions of ideology might result in operational-symbolic conflict. If individuals vary in the 
salience they ascribe to either the economic and cultural dimensions, as Feldman and Johnston 
(2013) and Baldassari and Goldberg (n.d.) suggest, then they would be more likely to make 
issue-label mismatches. We leave this possibility to be tested in further analyses.  
 
Conclusion 
As a number of researchers have noted, one of the most puzzling features of ideology in the 
American public is the incongruence between the conservative majority, when ideology is 
viewed symbolically, and the liberal majority, when ideology is examined operationally. We 
contribute to the understanding of this incongruence by gathering and examining new issue-level 
measures of ideological incongruence.  
                                                            
5 Note that we also ran both issue levels models using only mismatches on economic and cultural 
issues. The effects are similar within direction and across issue domain, with perhaps one exception: 
Republicans show more conflicted conservatism on economic but not cultural issues. Results are available 
in the supplementary materials (Tables S3 and S4).   
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Using these more finely-grained measures, we confirm a number of the descriptive 
findings made in Ellis and Stimson’s (2012) landmark study of ideology. First, we show that the 
more common form of incongruence is the labeling of liberal issue positions as conservative. 
More than 40 percent of conservatives, and more than 30 percent of the entire sample, hold at 
least one liberal position and describe this position as conservative.   
Second, Ellis and Stimson suggest that these “conflicted conservatives” are, for the most 
part, conflicted on the issues of social spending. We find that this indeed the case: 20 percent of 
conservatives actually hold a liberal position on education spending but regard their position as 
conservative. The percentage doing the same for social security spending is 15 percent.   
Third, Ellis and Stimson explain this ideological incongruence as the product of three 
pathways: ideological constraint, elite frames, and apolitical sources of labeling, particularly 
religious values. Our analysis supports their argument by showing that lower knowledge and 
higher religiosity is strongly associated with increased levels of liberal position-conservative 
label mismatches. We also include a number of additional tests of the elite framing pathway. We 
find that watching Fox News and being around 50 years of age increases the likelihood of issue-
level conflicted conservatism.  
We also go on to extend the findings of Ellis and Stimson. First, following Popp and 
Rudolph (2011), we give greater emphasis to group identities. Ideological, partisan, and ethnic 
identities, we argue, might be expected to shape individual issue positions and ideological labels 
through the process of social identification. Indeed, we find evidence that both ideological and 
partisan identities shape the likelihood of describing one’s liberal issues positions as 
conservative. In particular, both conservatives and Republicans are independently more likely to 
do so than liberals and Independents. 
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Second, we also document and examine ideological incongruence in a symbolically 
liberal direction—describing one’s conservative positions as being liberal. While less prevalent 
than Ellis and Stimson’s “conflicted conservatives,” we find that over 20 percent of our sample 
make at least one of these labeling mismatches.  
As with liberal position-conservative label mismatches, we find that both ideological and 
partisan identities affect the propensity to make these conservative positions-liberal label 
mismatches. But our analysis reveals that this pattern of ideological incongruence is also shaped 
by ethnic identities: both African Americans and Hispanics, being groups that stand to benefit 
from liberal policies, tend to use the liberal label even for conservative policy positions.  
Finally, we consider the role played by economic versus cultural issues in the conflict 
between positions and labels, as suggested by the bidimensionality arguments of Shafer and 
Claggett (1995), Feldman and Johnston (2013), Treier and Hillygus (2009), and others. We find 
that conflicted conservatism largely occurs on economic issues, while conflicted liberalism 
emanates from issues on both dimensions. Because we do not have data on the salience of 
dimensions, we consider the evidence quite tentative and deserving of further investigation. 
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Figure 2. Position-Label Mismatches by Policy Issue and Direction of Mismatch
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Bars indicate the proportion of respondents making a policy-label mismatch. There are two possible kinds of labeling
errors: expressing a liberal policy preference but labeling this preference as conservative (first column), or expressing
a conservative preference and labeling it liberal (last column). Rows are the 14 policy issues. Numbers in grey are the
number of respondents making the corresponding mismatch.
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Table 1. Four Conceptions of Political Preferences
Symbolic Operational
General level Symbolic ideology Operational ideology
Issue level Issue label Issue position
1
Table 2. General Level Mismatches Between Symbolic and Operational Ideology
Operational Symbolic ideology
ideology
Liberal Moderate Conservative Total
Liberal Row % 44.5 38.9 16.6 65.8
N (514) (449) (192)
Column % 95.2 76.7 30.5
Conflicted
conservatives
Conservative Row % 4.3 22.7 73.0 34.2
N (26) (136) (439)
Column % 4.8 23.3 69.5
Conflicted
liberals
Total Column % 30.7 33.3 35.9
Cross-tabulation of operation and symbolic ideology at the general level (the first row in Table 1).
Numbers in the upper right of each cell are row percentages (within categories of operational ideol-
ogy), while those on the centre left are column percentages (within categories of symbolic ideology.
Sample sizes and percentages are weighted and averaged across the ten imputed datasets. For the pur-
poses of this analysis, operational ideology is calculated as follows: any liberal response to a policy
question is coded as -1, a conservative response, +1, and an uncertain response, 0. The scores are
then summed across the 14 issues, such that a negative (positive) value reflects, on balance, a liberal
(conservative) operational ideology.
2
Table 3. Issue Level Mismatches Between Symbolic and Operational Ideology, Pooled Across 14 Issues
Issue Symbolic label
positions
Liberal Moderate None of these Conservative Total
Row % 31.7 40.0 16.4 11.9 46.5
Liberal N (3627) (4574) (1870) (1359)
Column % 79.6 53.1 34.8 22.5
Conflicted
conservatives
Row % 5.5 39.4 41.8 13.3 21.1
Neither N (287) (2049) (2172) (689)
Column % 6.3 23.8 40.4 11.4
Row % 8.0 25.0 16.8 50.2 32.3
Conservative N (639) (1986) (1336) (3993)
Column % 14.0 23.1 24.8 66.1
Conflicted
liberals
Total Column % 18.5 35.0 21.9 24.6
Cross-tabulation of issue positions and symbolic labels thereof (the second row in Table 1). Data are
pooled across all 14 issues. Numbers in the upper right of each cell are row percentages (within issue
positions), while those on the centre left are column percentages (within symbolic labels). Numbers
in parentheses are the sample size, pooled across all 14 issues, within each cell. Sample sizes and
percentages are weighted and averaged across the ten imputed datasets.
3
Table 4. Frequency of “None of These” as a Label for Issue Positions, by Symbolic Ideology
Liberals Moderates Conservatives
% Issue % Issue % Issue
10.7 taxing the wealthy 21.5 taxing the wealthy 10.9 education
12.7 same sex marriage 21.7 education 14.3 same sex marriage
13.0 abortion 24.3 Medicaid 14.4 taxing wealthy
14.1 education 24.4 minimum wage 14.7 health care reform
16.2 global warming 25.6 abortion 15.1 abortion
17.1 gun control 26.1 global warming 16.2 gun control
17.5 minimum wage 26.7 same sex marriage 19.1 immigration
18.2 affirmative action 27.6 gun control 20.2 business regulation
18.9 health care reform 28.4 immigration 20.2 minimum wage
20.0 Medicaid 29.8 health care reform 21.4 global warming
21.0 business regulation 29.8 business regulation 21.9 Medicaid
21.9 immigration 30.1 affirmative action 23.2 affirmative action
26.1 Medicare 35.2 Medicare 28.6 Social Security
31.2 Social Security 37.3 Social Security 29.4 Medicare
Percent columns are the percentage of individuals in each category of ideological identity (liberal,
moderate, conservative) who chose “none of these” as a label for their issue position. Rows are sorted
in ascending order.
4
Table 5. Determinants of General-Level Conflicted Conservatives and Liberals
Dependent variable: whether respondent is a... Conflicted Conflictedliberal conservative
Strength of symbolic identitya .16 (.45) 1.64∗ (.23)
Partisan identity:b Republican −.63 (.81) .34 (.33)
Partisan identity: Democrat .57 (.76) −1.18∗ (.29)
Ethnic identity:c Hispanic −1.06 (1.31) .48 (.28)
Ethnic identity: Black −1.25 (1.19) .41 (.33)
Ethnic identity: Other race −15.54∗ (.45) .50 (.39)
Political knowledge −.51 (1.15) −1.88∗ (.48)
Main news source:d Fox −1.43 (1.25) .10 (.33)
Main news source: MSNBC −.14 (1.28) −.58 (.80)
Age 5.20 (4.69) −2.62 (1.91)
Age squared −7.04 (5.15) 3.97 (2.39)
Religiosity .94 (1.04) 1.31∗ (.44)
Religion: Evangelical Christian .06 (.61) .26 (.24)
Operational ideology:e economic 5.04∗ (1.71) −5.21∗ (.82)
Operational ideology: cultural −1.23 (1.43) .02 (.62)
Gender: female −.16 (.57) .34 (.21)
Education −4.13∗ (1.45) −1.06 (.72)
Region: South .48 (.54) .23 (.20)
Income .05 (1.44) 1.28 (.68)
∗p< .05
aIntensity, not valence, of symbolic ideology.
bOmitted category is Independents.
cOmitted category is White.
dOmitted category is all other news sources.
eConservative = high.
N = 1725. Standard errors in parentheses. All variables rescaled to the [0,1] interval. Estimates obtained using
logit regression models for complex survey data, combined for the ten multiply-imputed datasets. Intercepts not
shown.
5
Table 6. Determinants of Issue-Level Conflicted Conservatism and Liberalism
Conflicted liberalism: Conflicted conservatism:
Dependent variables: No. of liberal labels No. of conservative labels
used for conservative used for liberal
positions (out of 14) positions (out of 14)
Symbolic ideology: Conservative .89∗ (.21)
Symbolic ideology: Moderate .63∗ (.23) .53∗ (.20)
Symbolic ideology: Liberal .95∗ (.24)
Partisan identity:a Republican .13 (.21) .30∗ (.15)
Partisan identity: Democrat −.38∗ (.16) .05 (.17)
Ethnic identity:b Hispanic .47∗ (.20) −.13 (.18)
Ethnic identity: Black .53∗ (.22) .06 (.19)
Ethnic identity: Other .14 (.20) −.07 (.21)
Political knowledge −1.21∗ (.35) −.83∗ (.27)
Main news source:c Fox .24 (.29) .43∗ (.18)
Main news source: MSNBC −.02 (.43) −.37 (.43)
Age −2.38 (1.33) 1.96 (1.12)
Age squared 2.76 (1.91) −2.72∗ (1.38)
Religiosity −.01 (.26) .97∗ (.24)
Religion: Evangelical Christian −.02 (.16) −.25 (.13)
Operational ideology:d economic 1.14∗ (.51) −2.04∗ (.38)
Operational ideology: cultural .90∗ (.44) .20 (.36)
Gender: female −.13 (.15) .03 (.10)
Education −.81 (.51) −.66 (.41)
Region: South .05 (.14) −.10 (.12)
Income .33 (.46) −.68 (.37)
∗p< .05.
aOmitted category is Independents.
bOmitted category is White.
cOmitted category is all other news sources.
dConservative = high.
N = 1725. Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates obtained using overdispersed logistic-binomial regression
models for complex survey data, combined for the ten multiply-imputed datasets. Intercept not shown.
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